In terms of risk, we look at what technical and test objectives the USAF considers when being constrained to a tight and immutable commercial launch schedule. This affects payload development in particular. Our general conclusion is that, to the greatest extent possible, studies on payload and most systems integration work should be completed before the USAF goes on contract with the comsat provider.
Many technical issues have arisen as the launch date nears. It has become clear to Third Generation Infrared Surveillance (3GIRS) program management that certain technical aspects of hosting an IR sensor on a commercial satellite create both contracting and technical challenges as the USAF endeavors to mature this technology.
Ultimately, we conclude that the complications in schedule and performance from commercially hosting full-earth field-of-view payloads must be mitigated by substantial upfront system engineering between the IR payload under development and the particular commercial satellite bus. To the greatest extent possible, the management chain must be simplified to improve communication among the principal parties. This will require substantial changes to the contractual structure of the next rideshare acquisition. Overall, the risks inherent to rideshare are adequately offset by the much lower costs compared to developing a freeflying spacecraft. The lessons learned here can be applied on future commercially-hosted payloads to advance technology and minimize the risks to a future system.
INTRODUCTION
Commercial rideshare programs represent an innovative way to get a small payload into space. Rather than pay the significant expenses for its own launch, the Government can "piggyback" on a commercial satellite already scheduled to take off. Many commercial satellites have a surplus of space and power -capabilities that would normally go to waste. Under the rideshare concept, the commercial satellite provider can capitalize on this excess by hosting a secondary payload. The provider gets paid for surplus space on its satellite, and the Government gets a payload into orbit at a fraction of the normal cost.
The USAF has begun to explore the possibilities of ridesharing in its Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload (CHIRP) project.
In CHIRP, a commercial satellite provider will carry an experimental infrared sensor into space. From there, the prototype will send data to a ground station so that the Government can evaluate how well the sensor works in its operational environment. The program represents a bold new way to mature technology: a cheap alternative to free-flyer missions that still gives the Government first-hand knowledge of the device's flightworthiness and performance.
CHIRP has not been a completely smooth ride, however. The Government team encountered a number of challenges in the rideshare program, both technical and contractual. While these obstacles have not proved insurmountable, future rideshare projects would do well to apply the lessons learned from CHIRP's technical and programmatic challenges. The Government's experience with CHIRP suggests that prudent contractual arrangements and better upfront systems engineering can avoid the bulk of these issues without sacrificing the chief benefits of ridesharing.
The CHIRP Sensor Figure 1 full-earth staring approach as the most promising alternative technology due to its simplified design and high performance possibilities. The current DSP and SBIRS sensors employ an active scanning method to monitor missile launches and other IR events. Using this scanning method, a sensor can only cover a particular swath of the earth for a limited period of time. By contrast, a starer sensor passively "stares" at a portion of the globe continuously to detect missile launches or IR events. 2 The staring system has possibilities of enhanced performance over traditional technology.
HISTORY OF CHIRP
SMC/XR chose to pursue a "back to basics" approach with the 3GIRS program. Under this approach, the USAF would mature the starer technology prior to formal acquisition, use designs with higher technical maturity levels, focus on risk reduction, design the program to be tested at key phases, and emphasize realistic cost estimates. In other words, SMC/XR set out to prove this alternative technology for a competing Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) system while mitigating risks, minimizing cost, and relying on mature technology as much as possible -no mean feat.
As part of the risk reduction effort, SMC/XR tasked AFRL to compete the development of staring sensor prototypes. AFRL awarded two contracts for full-earth staring sensors to SAIC and Raytheon. SAIC's sensor used four ¼ earth staring sensors, while Raytheon opted for a single-eye sensor.
The CHIRP Proposal -A Rideshare to Space
In January 2008, the Government received an unsolicited proposal for a "Commercially Hosted Infrared Payload" Flight Demonstration Program. The CHIRP proposal was essentially for a rideshare project to test out the new WFOV technology.
The submitter, Americom Governmental Services, proposed placing a prototype sensor onto an Enhanced STAR 2.4 satellite bus manufactured by Orbital Sciences Corporation. This bus was already scheduled to launch into geosynchronous orbit in 2010 as a commercial communications satellite, but it had enough capacity to host a small ¼ earth IR staring payload. The CHIRP proposal included five elements: the launch vehicle, the space vehicle, the satellite operations center, the CHIRP Mission Operations Center (CMOC), and CHIRP Mission Analysis Center (CMAC).
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The Government went on contract with Americom in June 2008, using a firm, fixed-price contract. The Government elected to test out one of SAIC's ¼ earth sensors on the rideshare. The cost was far less than any free-flier alternative. Not only would this be a cost effective and quick way to mature the technology (as opposed to the long schedules typical to military free-flier programs), but it would also pave the way for opportunities to better align the military and commercial space sectors for future "rideshares."
The CHIRP Program
As the prime contractor, Americom is responsible for both coordinating with the comsat provider to load and launch the payload and for communications between the satellite and the ground station. Prior to the CHIRP program, Americom's parent company, SES, had already contracted with Orbital for the construction of three satellite buses: OS1, OS2, and OS3. OS2 was the designated comsat host for CHIRP, with a launch date scheduled in May 2010. As a part of Americom's offering, Orbital would provide a unique feature, a Secondary Payload Interface (SPI). The SPI permits the USAF to control the secondary payload independently from its satellite host. Orbital also agreed to take responsibility for establishing and managing the mission operations center. Orbital then subcontracted to SAIC to execute the flight demonstration and manage the mission analysis center, which will process mission data and assess its quality.
CHIRP Contractual Flowdown
Figure 3
Americom, the comsat provider, had already contracted to launch on an Ariane V rocket outside the US. Though US Government payloads are typically required to be launched on US-made launch vehicles, this policy does not apply to a "government secondary scientific payload for which no US launch service is available." 3 Consequently, the Government is not required to use a US-made launch vehicle for CHIRP.
Furthermore, both the launch and primary payload are commercial. This effectively locks the government and its contractor into a tight and immutable schedule. The advantages, from a cost and schedule perspective, are analyzed further in the next section. However, this leaves the Government and its contractor very little time to address the technical concerns and problems that may arise (as discussed in the subsequent section "Technical Considerations and Lessons Learned").
ADVANTAGES OF RIDESHARE CONCEPT
The rideshare concept can potentially save the Government millions of dollars and expedite the launch schedule for small payloads. Most importantly, it may help advance nascent technologies through the Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) to the point where they can be used operationally.
Cost
Employing the rideshare concept to launch future R&D payloads can save the Government millions of dollars by obviating the need to fund and coordinate a separate launch. Launch costs are a major component of most satellite systems; in many instances the costs of fuel, engines, and launch site operations exceeds the cost of the satellite itself. 4 The rideshare concept avoids this expense by allowing the Government to attach a secondary payload to a commercial bus.
The Government must pay for the privilege of hitchhiking on a commercial satellite provider's rocket, of course; but this cost is modest compared to either a commercial customized or military free-flier launch. Discounting the cost of the CHIRP sensor itself, the Government calculated that a free-flyer technology demonstration would cost between $197 million and $354 million. Even a militaryhosted rideshare was estimated to cost $145 million. In contrast, Americom agreed to host the secondary payload for $65 million -less than half the cost of any of the Government's alternatives. 
Schedule
In addition to saving money, the rideshare concept can also save the Government time by giving it more opportunities to launch into geosynchronous orbit and committing it to tighter, immutable launch schedules. Commercial providers typically launch three or four satellites into geosynchronous orbit annually. Furthermore, it is projected that between 2006 and 2011, seventy-five out of a total of 115 launches will be commercial GEO satellites. Each of these launches has at least the potential to host a secondary payload. In contrast, Government launches are less frequent. Moreover, launches of experimental payloads are often vulnerable to delay due to strategic considerations. For example, a prototype satellite may be slated to launch during a particular window, but another agency could still have priority if its mission serves more immediate national security interests.
Commercial satellite providers are typically more efficient at developing, building, and launching satellites. Commercial satellites generally have great commonality and as such can be produced more rapidly in assembly-line fashion. This efficiency is enhanced and driven by market forces; since providers do not begin generating income until the satellite is in the sky, they have a strong incentive to meet their schedules. As a result, the turnaround for commercial spacecraft programs is typically just 24 months. Moreover, because of increasing demand for their services, these satellites are constantly being produced. In contrast, it can take years for the Government to agree to the requirements and contract to build a special purpose spacecraft to take a payload into orbit.
Technology Readiness Level
The rideshare concept may not just accelerate the launch campaign.
In some cases, it may actually promote technological breakthroughs that would otherwise never leave the lab. In the end, it is the warfighter and American citizen who will benefit from rideshare.
Before the Government can take advantage of a new technology, it must ensure that the technology is sound and reliable. The Government measures technological maturity through a metric of TRLs. The nine TRLs span the gamut from the observation of basic principles to successful mission operations.
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A key stage for the USAF and other agencies is TRL 7, which is marked by a system prototype demonstration in an operational environment. Table 2 . TRL Descriptions TRL 7 represents a major turning point in the technology's reliability. According to the DoD officials, "technology is considered sufficiently mature to start a program when it reaches a readiness level of 7." 6 The DoD usually requires that technology reach TRL 7 before an acquisition program can advance to Milestone C. 7 This requirement aims to prevent the DoD from incurring unforeseen costs midway through a program due to technology failure.
To understand these risks, one need only look at the track records of the Space-Based Infrared Surveillance (SBIRS) and National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS). Both of these programs have suffered significant cost overruns and numerous delays, in part because the teams failed to mature the technology before going forward. by giving it to operational forces to see how it fares in simulated battle conditions against an opposing force. 9 Under the "stage-gate" approach to maturation, a technology can only advance to the next stage if it meets pre-established performance criteria. 10 Yet most development programs lack the funding to reach TRL 7. To achieve this level for a satellite, the USAF must test the system prototype in its operational environmentspace. As discussed earlier, the costs of a free-flyer mission can easily run into the hundreds of millions of dollars -if not billions. Without considerable funding, a technology cannot advance to TRL 7 and consequently will not proceed as a full-fledged program. This bottleneck has been described by analysts alternately as a "brick wall," "valley of death," or "chasm;" regardless of the terminology used, this gap between TRL 6 and TRL 7 routinely prevents space technology from reaching timely fruition. The rideshare program breaks down this brick wall by providing a relatively inexpensive and frequently available means for getting a prototype into space. The small size and weight of a typical R&D prototype make it an ideal secondary payload.
By facilitating technology demonstrations in a relevant space environment, rideshares could help usher other promising technologies into TRL 7 which would otherwise languish indefinitely at lower TRL levels. 
Why Rideshare Is Particularly Useful for IR Technology
The comsat platform is well-suited for testing a new IR sensor. Commercial comsats typically have the excess space and power to host a secondary payload. Moreover, they typically also have low jitter, and their platforms are relatively stable, which is important for testing an IR sensor. WFOV technology will also capitalize on the location of these satellites.
Comsats are predominantly in geosynchronous orbit, which is ideal for a WFOV staring IR sensor.
Furthermore, they are positioned at advantageous locations, thus allowing the USAF to choose a host satellite over an "area of interest."
In many ways, the WFOV technology is well suited to take advantage of the rideshare program. The USAF has recognized a need and requirement for new WFOV sensors as part of the next generation of missile warning. 13 Although this technology has been developed extensively, it
has not yet been tested in space. Thus it remains poised on the frontier separating TRL 6 from TRL 7.
TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED LESSONS LEARNED
Other Government rideshare programs can benefit from the technical and design lessons derived from the CHIRP project. A number of these lessons also apply to general spacecraft design, manufacturing and contracting.
In this section, we detail the technical challenges encountered by CHIRP and potential solutions for future projects. Some of the problems can be fixed through better systems engineering, design or contracting. Other problems result from characteristics inherent to commercially-hosted payloads and therefore do not have realistic solutions. In the future, the US Government must take these issues into consideration when performing trade studies on whether to host payloads commercially. 
Commercially-hosted payload design and space vehicle requirements
Self-sufficient payload
The CHIRP space vehicle supplies CHIRP with power, space, and transponders to downlink IR data. Information such as attitude, space vehicle monitored analogs, or time is not propagated from the space vehicle to the payload. This issue cannot be easily resolved on the ground. Uncertainties in the space vehicle downlink time latencies make it difficult to obtain accurately time-tagged attitude and lineof-sight information to correlate with the payload data. CHIRP must rely on in-scene star and static source identification for high fidelity line-of-sight calculations, which precludes near real-time mission data processing. Another issue with the commercial host is the autopromotion of the space vehicle data on the ground. The excessive timeframe necessary to accredit the ground system from an information assurance standpoint required CHIRP to resolve the issue with the standard sneaker net solution. The ephemeris and space vehicle data is transferred once a day and nominally lag the payload data by 12 hours. While this initially appears only to delay the start of the data analysis, uncertainties in the space vehicle downlink time latencies and the 12 hour time-lag makes it difficult to correlate accurately time-tagged attitude and line-of-sight information with the payload data. This affects the accuracy of the data processing results. Even if this correlation was possible, the accuracy and frequency of attitude data transmitted by the commercial host may not be sufficient for CHIRP as most commercial space vehicles do not have the same level of requirements in terms of ephemeris and attitude accuracy as an IR payload. There are many potential solutions for this problem, which can be incorporated into future systems. One possible solution is to add on-board infrastructure for information transfer between the space vehicle and payload. In this case, the payload will still be at the mercy of the space vehicle for required information. Another solution is to make the payload self-sufficient by adding components, like IR star trackers and GPS capability; however, this increases payload cost, weight, power and size, These are trade-offs that must be made prior to selecting the host satellite.
Currently, the Government is investigating ways to properly calibrate the CHIRP sensor on-orbit and to monitor focal plane array degradation. A typical approach to calibrating a sensor on-orbit is to either provide on-board calibration sources or take flat field background images of deep space. Given the WFOV nature of the CHIRP sensor and the size of the calibration source that is required, the first alternative was not feasible within the allowed weight budget. The second approach is also not feasible, because CHIRP is not gimbaled and the space vehicle provider's contractual responsibilities to its communication customers prevent it from nodding the satellite periodically during CHIRP's mission life. The second option also requires on-board storage for when the space vehicle nods off-axis and the line of sight ground communication breaks. Furthermore, once communication is restored, there is currently insufficient bandwidth to telemeter both the stored data and real-time data. For future payloads, a self-sufficient design, which takes into consideration space vehicle capabilities, power, and weight limitations, can help mitigate on-orbit calibration requirements.
Space vehicle specifications
Before contract signing, the Government was not provided the necessary systems engineering documents detailing specifications of the space vehicle design. This created many non-optimal sensor configuration decisions in which the Government had to sacrifice performance to accommodate the "do no harm to the space vehicle" paradigm. First, the payload baffle had to be shortened because of interference between it and one of the vehicle's antennae. The sensor optics were hence exposed to the omni antenna, a source of additional and variable scattered light that contributes to sensor noise and clutter in the background, making targets harder to detect. Second, the payload cryocooler was designed with insufficient knowledge of the heat dissipation plan for the space vehicle. These problems could have been avoided or at least mitigated more effectively if high fidelity 3D CAD drawings, thermal model, and space vehicle con-ops were provided to the Government before contract signing.
In terms of space vehicle design trade studies, requiring the contractor to deliver all trade study documents will not only give the Government more insight into the trades made, but also confidence in the space vehicle provider by evaluating the demonstrated technical capability in the study results. It would also be beneficial for the Government to review the list of all available space vehicle telemetry and determine what is required for mission data processing and archival. Allowing the space vehicle provider to subset the space vehicle telemetry list averts the contractor proprietary data issue. However, when anomalies occur and data are out of the ordinary, additional space vehicle telemetry may assist in anomaly resolution.
Other considerations
Additional lessons may be learned with respect to commercially hosted payloads. For example, the Government should require the contractor to deliver all spacecraft ranging data since higher fidelity ephemeris may be calculated through other sources given ranging. The contractor should also deliver the decompression algorithm so that on-board compression can be reversed on the ground. In addition, the compression algorithm should also be requested for testing purposes.
Furthermore, the CHIRP Mission Operations Center (CMOC) is not staffed 24/7 for the mission life since CHIRP is a R&D sensor. Consequently, a requirement should have been levied to autonomously monitor payload state of health during off-hours with some automated notification capability.
The Government should also receive space vehicle maneuver schedules, sensor task plans, and daily status reports as contract deliverables.
In addition, as part of the integration test schedule risk reduction effort, the CHIRP ground system is distributive in nature. Given this, the proper number of simulators should have been developed and hosted at respective contractor facilities. To avoid software configuration issues, ICD noncompliance, and design assumption and interpretation issues, each simulator should be developed by the proper source, meaning the CMOC simulator should be developed by CMOC and not the CHIRP Mission Analysis Center (CMAC), as is the case now.
Finally, contractor proprietary information should be clearly defined in the contract. This type of information and information derived from it should be acknowledged early so that proper non-disclosure agreements can be obtained.
The Government, however, should strive to minimize information that is contractor proprietary during contract inception and consider all data sources including collected ground calibration data, I&T data, on-orbit data, and derived products.
Lessons not limited to commercially-hosted projects
Some of the lessons learned from CHIRP apply broadly to space acquisition. For CHIRP, Preliminary Design Reviews and Critical Design Reviews focused primarily on the hardware design. Even though software typically encompasses half of the effort, very little attention was given, making the determination of design pass/fail impossible. Since multi-day reviews are not desirable, separate hardware and software reviews should be convened for future projects. Interfaces between the software and hardware should be fully defined with detailed designs addressing both sides of the interface. When anomalies do arise, especially with interface flight electronics, procedures must be put in place to prevent quick patches. A board review should be convened with government oversight, and final government approval should be required before the contractor may proceed. From a program management perspective, the Government needs to have access to the requirements flow down matrix and verification matrix documentation in order to determine whether requirements are fulfilled. Lastly, at the end of the CHIRP mission life, the CMOC and CMAC contractor facilities are required to purge all classified CHIRP data in accordance with National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) requirements. The Government must stand up an archival capability at a government facility for the data to survive system termination.
Trade-offs of commercial hosts
Some downsides are inherent to commercially hosted payloads, and the government needs to take them into consideration when performing trade studies. For example, the fundamental concept of "do no harm to the spacecraft" should be a serious consideration for payload providers. This paradigm can detrimentally affect the payload's mission success. An extreme example of this paradigm is that there is no redundant power provided to the CHIRP payload and the power is fused. Determining the proper fuse size requires in-depth testing of maximum payload current draw during all modes of operation, including characterizing the in-rush current during initial power on. The fundamental concept naturally drives the space vehicle provider to minimize the fuse size, thereby putting the payload at risk. Once the fuse blows, the CHIRP mission life ends. Another example is that the CHIRP commercial host has less stringent contamination requirements than the CHIRP payload, which incorporates a WFOV telescope with high resolution optics. There are only very costly solutions to prevent CHIRP from being contaminated by the spacecraft environment. Lastly, the Government will be at the host's mercy in terms of the final spacecraft location. This may be indeterminate up to the day of launch. Even on orbit, the spacecraft may be moved if the commercial host's constellation health is at risk. In the worst case scenario, the spacecraft may be moved to a location that makes the payload's mission impossible.
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT LESSONS LEARNED
The USAF learned a significant lesson by pursuing a highrisk strategy with CHIRP. The program tried to synchronize two demanding schedules: the construction of a complex experimental payload and the launch of a commercial comsat. In the end, this strategy proved too ambitious.
The development of the WFOV ¼ earth sensor suffered multiple delays, while the launch timeline for OS2 remained largely unchanged. The Government attempted to address this possibility by including a "shared risk" clause in the contract. This clause stipulated that, at a particular point in the process, the Government could "off-ramp" the sensor from OS2 and later "on-ramp" it onto the next feasible launch. The Government would still have to compensate Americom for this change, but the cost was capped by a not-to-exceed price. However, when the time came to make the off-ramp decision, the Government mistakenly believed that the sensor would still be completed by the OS2 launch date. Moreover, the next available launch was on OS3, a rocket which was less attractive than the OS2 for a number of technical reasons. When the parties finally realized that the sensor would not be ready for OS2, they decided to delay OS2 instead of transferring the sensor to OS3. Consequently, the Government is faced with a dilemma: either terminate the CHIRP contract for convenience or pay Americom to delay the launch of OS2 without the protection of a not-to-exceed price.
The parties' differing conceptions of the schedule and conflicting interests almost derailed the CHIRP program altogether. The AFRL always had a very conservative schedule for developing the sensor, with ample margin for unanticipated delays. SAIC, on the other hand, was under great pressure from the Government and Orbital to show more immediate progress toward a fully functional payload. Faced with numerous technical setbacks, SAIC wanted to take technical shortcuts to compensate for its slipping schedule. For example, the AFRL wanted to set aside a month for calibration testing. Pressed to meet its deadlines, SAIC claimed that calibration testing was unnecessary since the sensor was merely for a flight demonstration. Another example of SAIC's aggressive test plan was to shorten thermal balance by testing at only one temperature rather than at three.
These disparate perspectives came to a head after a critical test of the sensor. SAIC claimed that the payload had passed the test and was still on schedule for a December 28 delivery. AFRL argued that the sensor failed the test and that the earliest possible delivery date was March 1. This incident was symptomatic of the conflicting attitudes and cultures at the two organizations. To resolve this crisis, the USAF requested that the principals -Americom, Orbital, both SAIC teams, AFRL, Aerospace, and SMC program manager -meet at the SDL to agree upon a realistic schedule with margin. After an arduous and stormy thirteen hour meeting, the parties finally concluded that April 1 was a feasible date for delivery. Of course, this shift in schedule had to be accommodated by Americom. The USAF also had to consider whether its new and unknown price tag would be worth pursuing.
This compromise date of April 1 still had to be approved by Americom's parent company, SES, which was nervous about delaying OS2. The satellite was intended to back-up OS1; if OS1 failed and OS2 were not available, SES would need to close up the gap by rearranging its fleet at great expense. Fortunately, the CHIRP project got a reprieve in the form of a merger between SES and another commercial provider. This merger increased SES's fleet of satellites and freed OS2 from its role as a back-up. After this merger, SES agreed to accept the payload as late as 1 April, 2010 -albeit at a not-to-exceed price of $18.75 million.
The complex contract structure surrounding the CHIRP project gave rise to significant communication problems. SES contracted with Orbital to build three communication satellites: OS1, OS2, and OS3. The contract called for Orbital to deliver these spacecraft at three-month intervals. Americom contracted with Orbital to integrate the payload onto OS2, and Orbital then subcontracted this responsibility to SAIC. Thus, SAIC had two separate contracts: one with AFRL to manufacture the sensor and another with Americom to integrate it. Initially, this arrangement seemed ideal: SAIC would develop the payload and then could apply their experience in putting it on the bus.
However, privity of contract issues and conflicting interests presented problems, particularly in the flow of critical technical information and schedules among the parties. SAIC established a firewall around its team working on sensor development and its team responsible for payload integration. This firewall not only cut off communication between the teams and the prime contractor but also between the two teams themselves. Although Orbital was the middleman between Americom and SAIC, it failed to relay communications between those two parties. The companies authorized only one person to bridge the gap between the various teams. This arrangement greatly constricted the flow of vital information and hampered efficient solutions to technical issues. This in turn led to delays in the schedule. This breakdown in communication was resolved only at the meeting of all the principals that established the April 1, 2010 delivery date for the payload.
CHIRP Contractual Structure
Figure 5
For future rideshares, the Government can mitigate some of these problems by competing a single contract for the whole project. This will give the Government more negotiating leverage than it had on CHIRP. It will also help alleviate many of the communication problems, management failures and culture conflict that arose under the CHIRP program.
CONCLUSION -THE WAY AHEAD
The rideshare concept has great potential to advance the TRL levels in a relevant space environment. With that end in mind, the lessons of CHIRP are crucial to the USAF and other government agencies. The USAF realized that Americom's unsolicited proposal would be challenging; however, the Federal Acquisition Regulations prevented the agency from substantially altering it. Moreover, nobody could foresee the array of technical, management, and other issues that would arise from developing the payload as a government-furnished item to be provided to Americom. Americom had little or no responsibility for the development of the payload at the AFRL, a situation exacerbated by the firewalls surrounding the various prime and subcontractors.
The USAF is interested in two more rideshares, but this time the agency seeks to advance from a ¼ earth prototype to a full-earth IR staring sensor. If successful, these missions will raise the TRL of WFOV technology to an even higher level. The USAF now recognizes the need to unify the disparate roles that had troubled CHIRP. The agency can accomplish this by emphasizing up-front and continuous systems engineering. In particular, attention must be focused on the relationship between the payload developer and the particular commercial satellite provider. This cannot be accomplished in a generic fashion -the payload must be developed with a specific bus in mind. Additionally, there will be requirements trade-offs between the payload under development and the commercial satellite. These trade studies must be done up-front to avoid many of the issues enumerated in Section 4. Ultimately, a single prime contractor must have end-to-end responsibility for the payload, the launch, and the delivery of meaningful data from the satellite.
Assuming Congress provides the funding, the USAF will compete the next full earth IR rideshare. Given a prime contractor's increased responsibility, the USAF must determine at what stage of development to deliver the payload to the winner of a rideshare competition. Its choices range from various stages of design to a fully qualified and fully tested payload ready for flight delivery. Admittedly, this new approach will put a heavier burden on the prime contractor. But it will mitigate the privity of contract and communication issues by giving the prime more responsibility for the entire space system. Hopefully, these lessons learned will streamline the management structure of the next IR full-earth rideshare. Such a ride is necessary to raise TRL to a point where the USAF will have confidence that this technology could be inserted into a program of record or could be a part of a new objective system.
